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Our study focuses on the labor market implications of vocational and technical education in the 
MENA region, analyzing the case of Egypt and Morocco. We try to assess the validity of those 
vocational systems by looking at the determinants of schooling choice and the effect of 
segregation between vocational and general education in rate of returns to education, wage 
differentials and wage inequality. Drawing conclusions from our analysis, we outline the main 
challenges faced by policy makers, namely the streamlining of inefficient education systems and 
the redressing of social stratification furthered by schooling choice based on the successful 




ترآز هذه الدراسة على تأثيرات سوق العمل بالنسبة للتعليم المهني والفني في منطقة الشرق األوسط وشمال إفريقيا وذلك بتحليل 
نحاول تقييم صالحية هذه األنظمة المهنية من خالل النظر إلي محددات خيار التعليم المدرسي وتأثير . صر والمغربحالتي م
وباالعتماد علي نتائج هذا . التمييز بين التعليم المهني والتعليم العام من حيث عائدات التعليم وعدم المساواة والفروق بين األجور
جعل األنظمة التعليمية التي تفـتـقر إلى الكفاءة : الرئيسية التي تواجه صانعي السياسات آما يليفإننا نجمل التحديات , التحليل
أآثر فعالية ومعالجة الطبقية اإلجتماعية التي أآدها خيار التعليم المدرسي وذلك باالستعانة بالتجارب الناجعة التي طبقت في دول 








Conventional wisdom  in education policy literature has been that while technical and tertiary 
skills are important for growth in developed countries, it is primary and secondary education that 
are related to development in poorest and intermediate developing countries. Accordingly, donor 
and lending agencies, including the World Bank, have been promoting investment in basic and 
general education in MENA and other developing regions (World Bank, 1995a; Psacharopoulos, 
1987, 1994). Amongst the reasons cited for such policy advice are the low rates of returns to 
vocational and technical education, the high cost of those types of education, and the weak 
relationship between vocational school graduates and the needs of the labor market. 
The experience of the East-Asian economies, such as Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea, 
demonstrate that investments in vocational skills at the secondary school level are beneficial for 
both the individual and society (Tzannatos and Jones, 1997; Green et al., 1999; Gill et al., 2000; 
Lynch, 1994). In contrast to these successes, one Arab Human Development Report (UNDP, 
2003) has highlighted the deep seated institutional, political and economic problems facing 
education in the region. Even in countries like Egypt, where reform of vocational secondary and 
higher institute technical education systems is now quite high on the policy agenda, recent 
analysis shows that the pattern of growth of technical education had little to do with a rational 
planning exercise or that it is even focused on how to provide young people with workplace 
relevant skills. Instead it was related to haphazard efforts to divert students aspiring for higher 
education. Today, technical education graduates are the group of the population most hit by the 
inadequacies of the education system, as attested by their high unemployment rates (Antoninis, 
2002).  
The inadequacy of the educational system is amplified by key structural issues in both Morocco 
and Egypt, where the traditionally large role of the state as an employer has given rise to labor 
market segmentation. There is evidence indicating that for a selected group of MENA countries 
(Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen) returns to education are generally higher in the public 
sector than in the private sector (World Bank, 2004), especially for specific social groups, for 
instance women (Said, 2002). 
Our research will investigate the impact of vocational secondary and technical higher education 
on labor market outcomes in MENA. Using recent household survey data for Egypt and Morocco, 
we will focus on the determinants of vocational versus general education. After analyzing the 
differences in returns to education over time and across different levels of education, we will 
investigate the interplay between different levels of education and characteristics such as gender, 
sector, and occupation and how those result in enduring wage differential and wage inequality. In 
particular, we will assess whether these differentials can be interpreted as a result of labor market 
segmentation according to education attainments. Finally, we will look at contexts in which 
vocational education has fared better and at the policy lessons to be learnt for MENA.  
II. Vocational Education and Labor Outcomes: A Literature Review 
Numerous recent studies shed a light on the pivotal role vocational and technical education plays 
in the process of development, both at an individual and societal level (for example Tunali, 2003; 
Bennell, 1996; Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998; Neuman and Ziderman, 1991). However, there has 
been an ongoing debate in academic circles on the effectiveness of vocational education, 
especially if compared to general secondary education. The prevailing consensus is that 
vocational education generally exhibits lower rate of returns than general education. However, 
many studies have challenged the orthodoxy by arguing that the impact of such programs is 
highly influenced by the context that surrounds their implementation (Kurovilla, 1996 and Arum, 
1998). Because national education policies are the result of a complex interplay of different 
developmental and historic circumstances, the results of vocational education are scattered across 
a wide spectrum: it is possible to find cases where vocational education outperforms general 
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education (notably Japan and South East Asian Tigers), from the Singaporean case where women 
who undergo skill-specific training are better off than graduates from general education 
(Sakellariou, 2003) to the experience of OECD countries where, in general, the opposite tends to 
be true (Hollenbeck, 1993; Cohn and Addison, 2003). When looking at the experiences of 
different developing countries, researchers are faced on one hand with success stories mainly 
from South-East Asian countries (Moenjack and Worswick, 2003; Sakellariou, 2003; Abdelkarim, 
1997) and on the other hand with cases where vocational education exhibits inadequate rates of 
return, like Peru (Bellew and Moock, 1990), Mozambique (Ziederman, 2001) or Papua New 
Guinea (Preston, 1993) to name just a few.  
Moreover, vocational education and its effect have traditionally received less attention on part of 
both policy makers and academics and are, therefore, subject to some misconceptions that 
underscore the complexity underlying the assessment of vocational education programs. For 
instance, some authors look at how vocational and general education ought to be perceived as 
complements rather than substitutes, while other look at the role of information and the matching 
of supply and demand as keys to success. Finally, another stream of research focuses on the issue 
of the higher costs of vocational training. 
Traditionally, vocational education and general education are seen as two mutually exclusive 
alternatives. One of the arguments that is usually put forward states that because of the specificity 
of vocational training, students are locked in occupations in a given industry and have no 
possibility to switch career path; evidence from Brazil (De Moura, 1987) indicates that highly 
specialized graduates of technical schools change jobs more frequently than ones with general 
education, implying that thorough, theoretically sound vocational education has a built-in logic of 
its own and is capable of producing a type of learning that is as transferable as general education. 
Looking at the political economy of education, many scholars suggest that the vocational-general 
education divide is the product of a post-industrialization class struggle that caused an expansion 
of vocational training where the “elite” relegates members of the “lower class” to technical 
schools (Bertocchi and Spagat, 2004; Herman, 1995; Oakes, 1983).  Riele and Crump (2002) look 
at the Australian experience to show how the increase of retention rate of secondary education 
was accompanied by a necessity to accommodate those entering tertiary education as well as 
those entering the job market directly. In countries where vocational and general curricula are two 
distinct options, scholars have endeavored to measure the relative advantages of one over the 
other. However, some studies focus on instances where students are able to enroll in hybrid 
programs. Kang and Bishop (1989) analyze twelve years of longitudinal data and find that those 
who devoted about one-sixth of their time in high school to occupation-specific vocational 
courses earned at least 12 percent extra one year after graduating and about 8 percent more seven 
years later (holding attitudes and ability in eighth grade, family background and college 
attendance constant). McMahon and Jung (1992) elaborate on the concept of optimum “mix” that 
allows curricula to be technologically progressive and adaptive. Specifically, they argue that 
occupation specific skills provided by vocational education are readily applicable on the job place 
and are therefore associated with higher starting wages and lower initial unemployment, but 
vocational skills have large effects on productivity only when there is a correspondence between 
one’s vocational skill and one’s job (Bishop, 1989; Neuman and Ziederman, 2001) and if hybrid 
educational tracks are based on the demands of the labor market (Paleocrassas, Rousseas and 
Vretakou, 2002). This implies that market-tailored educational curriculum providing both 
technical and general education may result in larger benefits from educational investment. 
Information plays a crucial role in improving the effect of vocational education in two distinct 
ways: firstly it allows prospective students to make informed choices on the vocational path they 
undertake and, secondly, information channels that match trainees and adequate job opportunities 
decrease the risk of unemployment of young graduates. In their study based on the Dutch labor 
market, Borghans, De Grip and Heijke (1996) investigate the mechanisms that allow vocational 
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education students to make informed choices that result in improved career prospects. It is argued 
that students assess the attractiveness of jobs based on the expected wage and that they form these 
expectations by looking at current wages. Labor market imperfections result in current wages not 
reflecting all relevant information, thus leading to a misallocation of vocational education 
graduates. One of the most prominent problems faced by students is the mismatch between the 
skills transferred through vocational education and those required by the labor market. 
In Peru, vocational education is nothing short of a spin-off of general education (Bellew and 
Moock, 1990) where students do not receive “hands-on” technical experience and therefore are 
unsuitable for the jobs they are ideally prepared for. It has been shown how vocational school 
completers achieve higher earnings than their counterparts who attended academic secondary 
schools only if they worked in occupations related to the vocational course of study pursued 
(Neuman and Ziederman, 1999; Sakellariou 2003). The necessity for vocational curricula that are 
attentive and responsive to the needs of the market is acknowledged even by those like Godfrey 
(1997) who argues for a “minimalist” approach to vocational education planning.   
One of the main problems associated with vocational education is that it requires more funding 
than general education. Tsang’s analysis (1997) illustrates how, in general, vocational/technical 
education is more costly than academic programs, while pre-employment vocational training is 
more expensive than in-service training. The recurrent cost per student in vocational and technical 
schools exceeds that for academic schools from a modest margin of 14 percent for Tanzania to a 
substantial margin of 620 percent for Honduras, with an average of 153 percent. Relative costs 
hinge on the length of schooling and the variety of subjects, both requiring specific equipment 
and trained teachers which are often in scarce supply. The problem of higher fixed and recurrent 
costs of vocational education is critically influenced by the scale of the program. Many studies 
have drawn attention to scale as a determinant for the success of technical education programs 
(Tsang, 1997; De Moura 1987). Both studies argue that the total costs of implementing a 
vocational education scheme result in substantial unit costs if the scale of the program is not 
adequate or if the wastage and drop-out rates are significant. These findings seem to be supported 
by the examples of many South-East Asian countries like Thailand, where high demand for 
vocational education graduates coupled with a historic propensity to invest in technical education 
have produced streamlined programs operating at the right capacity, leading to rate of returns for 
vocational education that are superior to those of general education (Moenjak and Worsowick, 
2003). The issue of costs can also bring useful elements to the design of policies, once private 
returns and social returns are analyzed separately. A study of returns to formal and informal 
vocational education in Côte d’Ivoire (Grootaert, 1990) illustrates the returns of these two forms 
of vocational training both for society and the individual. In terms of social costs, vocational 
training based on informal apprenticeships is less costly (because the costs are internalized by the 
employer rather than the education system); nonetheless, both informal and formal schemes of 
vocational education yield rates of return below the social opportunity cost of capital and 
therefore, in order to justify the investments in vocational education, society is required to 
advocate for non-quantifiable benefits. Individual returns to formal vocational education are 
higher than those to informal training, where “credentialism” leads both employers and students 
to value and reward the presence of a diploma. In fact, the Ivorian informal education system 
tends to absorb vocational education drop-outs or students that never gained access to formal 
education. The two systems, therefore, cater for two distinct groups and the different ways costs 
are absorbed across individuals, companies and society lead the author to argue for the validity of 
both systems: the promotion of informal education could increase society's returns to educational 
expenditures and contribute to realizing the employment creation potential of the informal sector 
together with the absorption of those students left behind by formal vocational education. 
Arguably, the best approach to the evaluation of vocational education is one that avoids making 
generalizations, but rather looks at the elements that positively or negatively influence the returns 
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to vocational training. One explanation worth considering is whether policy making can result in 
creating a sub-market of vocational education graduates that will eventually evolve in the 
secondary labor market. 
In the context of MENA, we decided to focus our attention on Egypt and Morocco, as these two 
countries epitomise some of the major trends of education policy within the region. Egypt is 
praised for now approaching universal primary school enrolment and closing the gender gap on 
that count, but criticized for over-investing in low quality secondary and tertiary education, 
whereas Morocco is seen to be one of only three countries in the region (the other two being 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen) where access to primary schools remains problematic; especially for 
girls (Van Eeghen, 2003; Megahid, 2004). Additionally, the 1990s have been a period of 
considerable socioeconomic changes in both countries as the structural adjustment programs 
undertaken were characterized by the adoption of economic liberalization policies predicated 
upon the retrenchment of the public sector, whose employment guarantee had historically created 
a group of technical education graduates trained in areas that predominantly catered for the needs 
of growing bureaucracies. For these reasons, and for the presence of a wealth of data, an analysis 
of the dynamics of education and labor market outcomes in Egypt and Morocco can be quite 
informative on both conceptual and policy grounds.  
III. Estimation Methodology 
Research on returns to education is based on the work by Mincer (1974). In the traditional 
specification, returns to education are estimated as follows: 
LnW = β0 + β1EDU + β2EXP + β3EXP2 + u       (1) 
Where EDU is the number of years of schooling, EXP is experience in years, EXP2 is experience 
squared, and u is a random disturbance term. The specification is shown logarithmically in order 
for the regressors to be interpreted in terms of marginal effects. In this way index β is interpreted 
as the rate of returns to schooling. This function that has been introduced by Mincer (1974) is 
known as the? human capital earnings function to education, which has been the basis of 
practically all research on returns   
Griliches (1977), however, pointed out that the coefficient estimates of the OLS estimation of the 
classical model could suffer from what is now known as ‘self-selection bias’. When individual’s 
family background and ability influence his/her educational attainment, the individual is said to 
be self-selected into that educational attainment. If educational attainment of an individual is 
partially determined by his/her abilities and family backgrounds, estimating the previous classical 
earnings function without taking into account the possibility that family background and ability 
might influence educational attainment, could give biased results.  
One approach to reduce the bias is to include control variables that might capture part of the 
unobserved components in the error term such as family background characteristics, specifically 
the father’s and mother’s level of education and the father’s occupation. An interaction term 
between education and family background can capture the effect of family background on returns 
to education.  
These results, however, are still subject to another type of selection bias. Basically, the equation 
has been estimated from data on workers, resulting in a censored sample of the entire population. 
When estimating the wage equation, only those who reported wages at the time of the survey are 
entered into the analysis, while the ones who were not working were not. In order to solve the 
problem of sample selection bias, Heckman (1979) suggests estimating two equations. First the 
participation equation is estimated, consisting in estimating through a logit, for the purpose of this 
study, the probability of having worked at the time of the survey, and out of school (using the 
entire sample: workers and non-workers). From the logit results, a selection variable (the inverse 
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Mills ratio term) is created. This estimate is used in the second step, as an additional regressor in 
the wage equation, yielding consistent estimates of the coefficients free of censoring bias. 
A recent extension to this model is to capture the so-called “certification effect” or “sheep skin 
effect”. The idea is that an employer might value a worker with a certificate more than a worker 
without one. For this reason, and to allow for estimated rate of return to vary by level of 
schooling, dummies for levels of education are used instead of years of schooling. The modified 
Mincerian earnings function is: 
LnW = β0 + ∑βkE.Dumik + β2EXP + β3EXP2 + u      (2) 
Where E.Dum consists of dummies for levels of education. Years of experience are calculated by 
the following formula: (age – years of schooling-6)  
1- First Stage: Multinomial Logit Model 
Ignoring the fact that the distribution of individuals between general and vocational education is 
not random offers potential bias in wage estimation (Heckman, 1974). Therefore, we assume that 
individuals determine their schooling choice before determining a sector of employment, and 
hence they face three mutually exclusive alternatives when it comes to pursuing post intermediate 
schooling: not joining high school (j=0), joining general education and presumably continue to a 
university education (j=1), or joining a vocational or technical1 schooling (j=2). Therefore, the 
model takes the form:  
Pj = exp (Zαj) / (1+ Σexp (Zαj))        (3) 
        j=1 
Where Z is a vector of explanatory variables that enter into the decision of choosing the type of 
education, j is a vector of unknown parameters of the alternative j. Following Lee, 1983; Trost 
and Lee, 1984, we employ a two stage method in order to estimate wage equations. The first is 
estimating the probabilities of schooling choice by maximum likelihood logit estimation. 
Followed by constructing the selection term as follows: 
λj = φ(Hj) / Φ(Hj)           (4) 
Where Hj = Φ-1(Pj); φ and Φ are the standard normal density and distribution functions 
respectively.  
Explanatory variables that enter into the logit model include: educational dummies for the father 
and the mother as proxies for household socioeconomic status. It is assumed that higher parental 
educational attainment to imply higher socioeconomic status.  Since the mother is often the 
provider of the learning environment for her children, the mother’s education (rather than the 
father’s) might have more significant impact on the individual’s education decision, as discussed 
in Behrman and Wolfe (1984), Chiswick (1986) and Heckman and Hotz (1986).  Regional 
differences in choosing a certain level of education are captured by regional dummies. Other 
explanatory variables2 include the number of siblings in the household. It is expected to find 
lower levels of educated parents and the presence of young siblings in the household to be 
associated with choosing a less risky type of investment in education, namely choosing a 
vocational schooling, since the graduate secures employment right after getting the certificate. 
                                                          
1 Vocational education certification is considered a dead end track in Egypt and Morocco. Although graduates of 
vocational schools are allowed to take part in university education after taking a special examination, few succeed in 
doing so. 
2 Following Tunali (2003) 
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2- Second Stage: Earnings Function 
Estimating the parameters in the first stage allows calculating the selection term, to correct for 
selectivity bias, which is then entered linearly into the wage equation. The dependent variable in 
the wage equation is the log hourly earnings for Egypt and log weekly earnings for Morocco. Log 
hourly and log weekly earnings are used (instead of hourly or weekly earnings) because they 
reduces the effects of earnings outliers. The model therefore is: 
LnW = β0 + ∑βkE.Dumik + β2EXP + β3EXP2 + ∑βj Reg. Dumij+ β4 λ +u (5) 
Where E.Dum are dummies for levels of education, experience, experience squared, regional 
dummies and the selection term. 
Experience variables are included in the model since workers with more years of job experience 
are likely to earn more. (Higher experience is often associated with higher skills and higher 
productivity). A firm is likely to use higher wages to induce experienced workers to stay on in 
their jobs, as the cost of training new workers could be very expensive. The experience squared 
variable is included to capture the possibility of a non-linear relationship between experience and 
earnings. We expect a positive sign of the experience variable for the reason that working 
experience is likely to contribute to enhancement of individual’s human capital, and negative 
coefficient of experience square as marginal returns from experience tend to decline over the 
lifetime.  
Interaction of the effects of schooling and experience on earnings should not be neglected. A 
common reason is the fact that the first few years in the labor market are time for experimenting 
and frequent job change. As a consequence, earnings of many individuals rise in their first years 
in the labor force, then level off and increases by a decreasing rate. Another rationale is that the 
life-time patterns of low levels of education and highly educated workers’ earnings differ by 
nature: for example, the marginal effects of experience on education for a worker with a lower 
level of education are likely to increase during the first years of work and diminish afterwards.  A 
university educated worker, on the contrary, faces increasing marginal returns to experience. 
Omission of the interaction variable, therefore, leads to the omitted variable bias in the 
coefficients estimates.  
IV. Data Sets  
Our study makes use of household survey data sets that contain a wealth of information on 
household composition and socioeconomic characteristics such as income, parental background, 
measures of access to the labor market, detailed education history, ownership of assets, migration 
histories and activity status.  
For the case of Egypt, the empirical analysis is based on the 1988 Egypt Labor Force Sample 
Surveys (LFSS), the 1998 Egypt Labor Market Survey (ELMS) and the Egypt Labor Market 
Panel Survey (ELMPS) for 2006. All three surveys are nationally representative household 
surveys covering 10,000 households in 1988, 5000 households in 1998 and 8500 households in 
2006. All surveys were carried out jointly by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) and the 
Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and were conceived 
as a periodical longitudinal survey, because they contain comparable data. In fact, the ELMPS 
2006 covers households included in the ELMS 1998, as well as those units that resulted from 
splits of the original households and a sample of new households. For Morocco, we used the 
Morocco Living Standard Measurement Studies (MLSMS) of 1990/1991 and 1998/1999, 
covering 3349 households and 5129 households respectively. Similarly in the case of Morocco, 
the data sets contain comparable data allowing for a periodical longitudinal analysis. 
For the purpose of this study, we extracted some variables such as: employment status, levels of 
education, age, experience, experience squared, regional dummies, parental education, 
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hourly/weekly wages (in logs), and number of siblings in the household (a dummy for presence of 
siblings less than 6 years of age; and a dummy for presence of siblings older than six years of 
age). Five regional dummies were used in Egypt in 1988, 1998 and 2006; eight regional dummies 
in Morocco for 1991 data, and 16 regional dummies in Morocco for 1999 data. The Moroccan 
data of 1991 did not have distribution by all 16 regions as was the case in 1999. There were cases 
with few observations on the mother’s level of education in Morocco in 1991, therefore, and for 
the purpose of this comparative study, we opted to use one dummy that takes the value zero for 
illiterate mothers and 1 for literate mothers. We used weekly wages in Morocco for lack of 
number for daily working hours in 1999, and because both surveys provided weekly wages. 
Moreover, because of high rates of seasonal employment within the agricultural sector, we 
restricted our analysis to non-agriculture workers, who are sons or daughters of the household 
heads between the ages of 15 and 64, and not currently enrolled in school.  
V. Empirical Results  
In this section of our study we focus on a comparison between the 1988 LFSS and 1998 ELMS 
data for Egypt with 1990 and 1998 MLSMS data from Morocco. The comparison allows us to 
draw important conclusions on the determinants of choice of general versus vocational education, 
which will be analyzed in detail in section A below. Moreover, we were able to estimate the rate 
of returns to education and, given the availability of new data for Egypt, we broke down our 
analysis for different percentiles of income distribution and then we extended it across the period 
from 1988 to 2006, as outlined in section B. Section C and D are devoted for a detailed study of 
the Egyptian case, namely, the issue of wage differentials across sectors and the issue of wage 
inequality. 
A. Determinants of Choice 
In line with most previous research, we treat schooling choice as a multinomial logit problem, 
where 4 levels of education are modeled: general secondary; 3 years vocational secondary; 5 
years vocational secondary; and university and above3.  In this sample, private sector workers are 
one of the following: middle school graduates; secondary general graduates; a 3 year vocational 
education graduates; a 5 year vocational school graduates, or university graduates. Given that the 
explanatory variables used in the analysis are dummies, the marginal effects show the effect of a 
discrete change from zero to one. The reference individual lives in rural regions, with illiterate 
parents, and no siblings 
Our analysis suggests that family background plays a substantial role in the child’s choice of an 
educational path. We note that both in 1988 and 1998 Egyptian mothers with low levels of 
education (illiterate and primary) increase the chances that their kids will join vocational 
education. On the other hand, mothers with higher education are more likely to influence their 
children’s decision to join general and, subsequently, university education. The father’s education 
is significant and increases in magnitude with levels of education, but the pattern basically mirrors 
that of the mother’s education. In both instances, the magnitude of the effect weakens in 1998.  
The effect of both parents on their kids decision to enroll at a university education is comparable 
when both parents are well educated (having obtained a secondary degree or and above). For 
example, a mother with secondary or post secondary degree increases the chance that her kids 
choose a university education by 5 and 3 percent compared with 6 and 4 percent with comparable 
fathers respectively.4 Moreover, siblings younger than 6 in the household increase the chances of 
the individual pursuing secondary general education before reform policies, but increases the 
chances of joining vocational education in 1998 after the reform. A possible interpretation is that 
                                                          
3 Small cell sizes did not allow distinguishing between commercial, industrial or agriculture nor within gender.  
4 These findings are consistent with Tunali’s in Turkey (Tunali, 2003). The higher the father’s education the less 
likely his son is to choose vocational education. 
 10
since the vocational education is considered a terminal degree, individuals with young siblings are 
expected to get a job right after graduating to help their families financially. Parents, who send 
their kids to vocational education, expect quick returns and less risky investment. Having siblings 
6 years of age or older had a positive effect on joining general education (secondary and 
university) before the reforms, but a negative effect afterwards, where they preferred to pursue the 
vocational track.5 
Moroccan data sets offer a slightly different picture. Regions of residence had no effect on the 
choice of the type of education in 1991, while in 1999 students residing in regions such as 
Oriental, G.Casablanca and Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer prefered to join the vocational schools 
rather than general schools. The mother’s education does not affect choice in 1991, but it does in 
1999, when we found that a mother with an upper secondary education influences her children’s 
choice of keeping away from vocational education. Another pattern emerges when we look at the 
effect of the father’s education. In 1991, the father's literacy appeared to have a negative effect on 
their children's decision to join general secondary education, and a positive one to choose a 
vocational education instead. The table also shows that the lower the level of the father’s 
education, the greater the effect he exerts on not choosing a general education. This pattern did 
not continue into 1999, when we see no effect of the father’s level of education on the education 
choices of the children. The existence of siblings in the household in Morocco did have a 
significant, though subtle, negative effect one on choosing a general education in 1991, while no 
significant effect was found in 1999. We can thus conclude that family background has the 
greatest influence on the schooling choice, as children tend to replicate the educational path of 
their parents (especially mothers) in both Egypt and Morocco. 
B. Returns to Education 
In this section we examine the labor market outcomes of secondary school graduates. Namely, 
how acquisition of general vs. vocational (or technical institute vs. university) education impacts 
the returns individuals obtain, once they enter the labor market. We will first look at a comparison 
of returns to education in Egypt and Morocco in the 1990s. In the second part of this section, we 
will disaggregate Egyptian data across percentiles and we will extend our comparison from 1988 
to 2006. 
Charts 4 and 5 show proportionate returns to vocational secondary, higher institute and university 
levels of education calculated across years, gender and sectors. The results show that by 2006 
(and like returns to experience) they were higher for females than males in the government sector. 
Except for vocational secondary school certificates, returns to higher educated groups are now 
higher in the private sector than in public sector. Thus the very notable decline in returns to 
vocational schools (entry level for those eligible for the public sector employment guarantee) 
witnessed between 1988 and 1998 has been reversed lately only in the government, but not 
elsewhere. For Moroccan males with university education (versus secondary) in public sector, 
returns dropped from 26 percent to 5 percent in a decade (Table 10). Males in the private sector 
also experienced a drop in returns at all levels of education. Despite a 1 percent drop in their 
returns, female university graduates in the public sector did fare better in 1999 than in 1990.  We 
can conclude that, as both countries went through a period of structural adjustment, they 
experienced substantial wage compression in most, if not all, sectors. As a consequence, rate of 
returns decreased for virtually every sector.  
When focusing on Egypt specifically, we need to be aware that the labor force is not well 
described by constant returns to education for all workers. The average may provide a misleading 
                                                          
5 Please refer to Tables for data. Tables 1-3 show descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis, while Tables 
4-7 show empirical results on the marginal effects of maximum likelihood multinomial logit estimation of schooling 
choice. 
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impression as to the variation in the magnitude of the pay gap across the wage distribution, as it 
implicitly assumes that the schooling-related earnings increment is constant across the wage 
distribution. Therefore, we attempted to account for this by resorting to a quantile regression. Our 
results show that experience has the expected profile, since a positive sign of the experience 
variable indicating working experience is likely to contribute to growth of individual’s human 
capital and a negative coefficient of experience square as marginal returns from experience tends 
to decline over the lifetime. Moreover, the coefficients of the education dummies all have the 
expected positive sign, and all are significantly different from zero at the 1% level or higher. 
These results may suggest that employers are affected by “credentialism” in their wage setting. 
The education coefficients in this case, may be regarded as evidence of “credentialism” or 
screening for ability.6  Our findings do not match those obtained by Assaad (1997) – using 1988 
data – and Antoninis (2001) – using 1997 data – on Egypt. Both Assaad and Antoninis found that 
rates of return to vocational secondary schooling and higher institutes in the private sector were 
either negative or very low. 
Returns to schooling drop over the wage distribution. Or, to put it differently, the earnings 
increment associated with schooling is lower for those individuals whose unobservable 
characteristics place them at the top of the conditional wage distribution. These findings imply 
that schooling may have a negative impact upon within-group wage inequality, as the spread of 
returns drops for higher educational levels. One explanation is that there is an interaction between 
schooling and ability, in which the least able can benefit more from their schooling and the pay 
gap between the more and less able shrinks for higher educational levels. In 1988, results show 
that returns to schooling at the lowest decile are almost equal for general secondary and 
vocational secondary graduates, but are higher for two-year higher technical education followed 
by university. These returns drop as we move up the wage distribution at all levels but goes up at 
the highest decile only for university graduates. We also notice an increase in earnings for those 
with general secondary at the mid distribution and beyond. In 1998, vocational graduates earned 
the lowest at all levels of wage distribution. University and secondary general graduates earned 
almost the same at the lowest and highest distribution. Additionally, graduates of two-year higher 
technical schools experienced a decline in their rewards. Between 1988 and 1998, university and 
vocational graduates experienced a decline in returns at the tail of the distribution, especially 
below the 25th percentile. On the other hand, general high school graduates experience abnormal 
returns at the tail of the distribution, and no change for the median individual. It can be argued 
that the decade 1988-1998 was a period of ‘polarization’ of the labor market, where the upper 
quartiles of each cohort experienced the greatest degree of change, with a staggering 30-40 
percent improvement for general high school graduates and declining rates for university and 
vocational education graduates. These findings, summarized in Chart 3, are consistent with the 
phenomenon of wage compression caused by the adjustment period.  
To sum up, the results on changes in returns to experience and education over the period under 
study confirm that the legacy of the predominance of the public sector as an employer and the 
impact of the public sector employment guarantee continues in the labor market in Egypt up to 
1998. The public sector in general, and the government in particular, offered the highest rewards 
for experience and education, and particularly so for females. Since 1998, however, there is 
evidence that the impact of the public sector employment guarantee started petering off, 
especially at the post-secondary institute and university levels where labor market returns are now 
highest in the private sector.  
                                                          
6 For a more detailed explanation of the methodology of Selectivity Corrected Quantile Regression please refer to the 
Appendix A.1. Data sets are summarised in Table (12). 
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C. Wage Differentials by Sector 
The 1990s have been a period of considerable socio-economic change. Both Morocco and Egypt 
opted for a downsizing of the government sector and for the implementation of liberalization 
measures, albeit with different intensity. The faster pace of the structural adjustment in Morocco 
had a more noticeable effect on wages over the span of one decade, while Egyptian wages seemed 
to follow the same trend, but over two decades.  
In Egypt we started from a situation where, throughout the decade (1988-1998), individuals with 
vocational education and university were more likely to reside in urban regions, which might have 
explained the over presence of vocational schools in urban than in rural regions. Tables 12 and 13 
display selectivity corrected estimates of the returns to education equations for public vs. private 
sectors in Egypt and Morocco respectively7. Table 12 presents returns to general and university 
education for public and private sector workers for 1988 and 1998 in Egypt. Selection terms are 
not significant in both years, except for public sector workers in 1988 with a small magnitude, 
which indicates that education selection does not pose a bias problem to estimates. Experience has 
the expected profile and all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level 
or more.8 Region of residence does not matter as a determinant of private sector earnings, but it 
does matter for public sector workers, where they earn their premium in Cairo, followed by the 
two urban regions, and the magnitude of these differences has widened in 1998. This is consistent 
with the fact that larger, and presumably higher paying units of the government tend to be 
concentrated in urban Egypt. 
Table 12 also reveals that differences between wages of all three types of education did not 
change significantly in the public sector between 1988 and 1998. On the contrary, private sector 
workers witnessed a spread in their wages. For example, university workers of the private sector 
earned 47% more than lower secondary graduates in 1988, as opposed to 54% in 1998— an 
increase of 13%. Furthermore, private sector vocational workers have witnessed a comparative 
increase in their wages reaching 17% over the 10 year period. Variations between general and 
vocational workers’ wages particularly increased in the private sector in 1998 compared to their 
level in 1988. These results may suggest that employers are affected by credentialism ('sheep-skin 
effects') in their wage-setting. The education coefficients in this case, may be regarded as 
evidence of credentialism, or screening for ability.  
For Morocco, the data in Table 13 reveals several interesting facts leading to one conclusion. That 
is, wages in Morocco have witnessed a compression and a more equal distribution in 1999 than in 
1991. For example, graduates of general and university education working in the public sector are 
earning 96% higher than those who did not continue through secondary education, while 
vocational graduates earned only 38% more. We notice a drop in returns in 1999 to 68% for the 
first group and an increase to 74% for vocational workers in the public sector. The same result is 
observed in the private sector. Between 1991 and 1999 general and university graduates working 
in the private sector witnessed a drop in their comparative wages to their lower education by 59%, 
whereas comparative differences rose in favor of vocational graduates by more than 13%. The 
'sheep skin effect' does not show up in Morocco. Private sector workers do not appear to have 
significant differences in earnings for both types of education. Contrary to Egypt, public sector 
workers in Morocco have witnessed compression in their wages between all types of graduates, in 
                                                          
7 In a previous version of this paper, we tested the interaction terms with levels of education and the rest of 
explanatory variables and did not see much of a difference in both countries. Therefore, we only report this version 
without interaction variables in the analysis. For a lengthier description of the Oaxaca-Blinder method, please refer to 
Appendix A.2. 
8 A positive sign of the experience variable indicates that working experience is likely to contribute to enhancement 
of individual’s human capital, and a negative coefficient of experience square points to the fact that marginal returns 
from experience tend to decline over the lifetime. 
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just eight years. Regional differences did not have any significant effect on wage determination in 
Morocco in 1991. It had some significance on public sector wages in 1999, with Oriental and 
Tangier workers having the lowest public sector wages in Morocco.  
Extending our analysis of the Egyptian case to the second decade of structural adjustment (Chart 
4), we will notice a similar trend — wage compression that resulted in declining returns in the 
government sector for all groups between 1988 and 1998. It is important to point out that it is 
women from all educational backgrounds and male graduates from post-secondary education who 
experience the biggest reductions. On the contrary, rewards in the government sector increased 
dramatically for all females by 2006, while they kept declining for all males except graduates 
from vocational education. We can conclude that the government has reverted to its role of 
‘model’ employer where disadvantaged groups find the higher level of returns. 
Given the absence of significant data for women in the private sector, it was only possible to 
include women with university level education in our analysis, whose results are rendered in 
Chart (5). After the decline between 1988 and 1998, all university graduates experienced an 
increase in their rate of return, especially women. Men with vocational education experienced a 
decline across the two decades, while the opposite is true of men with post-secondary education. 
We can conclude that private enterprises rewarded more those categories that did not find an 
adequate level of returns in the government sector. Notably, those categories hold the highest 
educational attainments. 
As for the sector wage gaps, Table 14’s crude differentials figures indicate that the relative 
position of both government and public enterprise workers has improved between 1988 and 2006; 
particularly for females where they reached 77-83% in 2006. After correcting for differences in 
worker characteristics, this conclusion of improvement in relative position of public sector 
employees is maintained , but at a lower level than indicated by the crude estimates. In 2006, 
males are no longer disadvantaged in the government sector as wages are nearly equal to what 
they would get in the private sector; they now earn a premium in the public enterprise equal to 
27%. The corrected female government and public enterprise premiums are about only 33% (not 
as high as the77-83% crude rate). These figures still indicate the attractiveness of the government 
sector for females, but the size of their premium compared to the private sector has now declined 
from its 50-60% level of 1988. 
D. Wage Inequality 
Finally, in this section we turn to an analysis of the implication of the above changes in wage 
differentials to the overall observed inequality (or dispersion) of hourly wages in Egypt. Table 15 
presents several standard statistical measures of inequality of both wages and earnings, calculated 
separately for males and females. In each case, an attempt was made to decompose measured 
inequality into a component attributable to changes ‘within’ and  another one to changes 
‘between’ important socio-economic groups (such as occupation, industry and education). In this 
paper, the measures of inequality estimated include the coefficient of variation, the decile ratio 
and the Gini coefficient.9 Another measure calculated is ‘half the square of the coefficient of 
variation’. This is a member of the general entropy (GE) indices which have the desirable 
property of being additively decomposable into components within and between groups. The 
groups considered are level of education (8 groups), occupation (9 groups) and industry (14 
groups).10  
                                                          
9 For an extended discussion of the different measures used to compute wage inequality please refer to Appendix A.3. 
10 The 8 education groups are the same as those in Tables A1-A2. The occupation and industry groups are standard 
one-digit classifications of occupations and sectors of economic activities used in recent CAPMAS publications. 
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Using all measures of inequality, hourly wages dispersion has in the sample over the initial 
observation period (1988-1998), but rebounded by 2006 again to the 1988 level or even higher in 
some measures. These results are mainly driven by what happened to males over the two periods 
which followed the same pattern as the whole sample (males are 80% of wage workers in the 
sample). For females, inequality either increased or, if we take our favored measure of decile 
ratio, stayed the same until 1998. All measures, however, indicate quite a dramatic increase in 
female hourly wage inequality between 1998 and 2006. 
Further decomposition of the GE index show that most of the observed inequality for males and 
females in the three years is ‘within’ (as opposed to ‘between’) groups. Over the period, however, 
for both males and females, there were some decline in inequality ‘between’ educational groups 
and occupations between 1988 and 1998 (consistent with the declining educational reported in the 
above wage regression results). The most important change that occurred between 1998 and 2006 
is the dramatic increase in within group inequality for both males and females. This is consistent 
with falling R2 in 2006 reported in the wage regression above which signifies that the standard 
human capital variables (controls for experience, education and region) are no longer sufficient on 
their own to explain major variation and dispersion of wages in Egypt.  
Table 15 shows Gini coefficients for different socio-economic groups over the period under 
study. It is noteworthy that the groups that witnessed the largest real wage increases between 
1998 and 2006 are also the ones that had the largest increases in inequality (females, higher age 
groups, rural-lower and urban-upper Egypt, services and higher educational groups). Looking at 
differences across institutional sectors, it is also interesting to note that whereas in 1988, hourly 
wages were most compressed (equalized) in the government sector and most dispersed the private 
sector, by 2006, the highest degree of dispersion is now observed in the government sector. This 
pattern is even more dramatic if we look at the decile ratios (see Chart 10). This can be taken as 
further evidence of the declining impact of the public sector employment guarantee and 
centralized wage bargaining in the government sector in Egypt in the new millennium. Chart (6) 
looks at the changes in wage inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient, and permits us to 
conclude that, while wages dropped remarkably between 1988 and 1999, the level of inequality 
was almost unchanged. On the other hand, the increase in wages in 1999-2006 was matched by an 
increase in inequality for all categories of workers; in particular, graduates of vocational 
education experienced a doubling in wage inequality. 
Looking at the changes in wage premia permits to reach interesting conclusions (Chart 7). The 
effect of ‘credentialism’ has increased, as the wage premium for literate people with an 
elementary school diploma has increased, albeit by a limited amount. The premium for general 
education graduates that pursue their education (both in University and in a Post-Secondary 
school) has increased, as a sign that the market values a better educated class of white-collars. At 
the same time the premium of general high school graduates has reduced substantially in favor of 
vocational graduates. We can conclude that the labor market seems to signal a strong preference 
for people with job-specific skills, from both vocational and above-high school education tiers.  
Finally, Chart (8) looks at the representation of the groups of graduates among low-earners will 
reveal that, quite remarkably, workers with vocational training have a higher probability (almost 
double) of being low earners than illiterate workers, in all three years, reaching almost 40 percent 
in 2006. At the same time, high school graduates represent 1 percent of all low-earners. This 
result may lead us to suspect that there may be an overhang of workers with vocational education 
or that their productivity level may be low, either because of lack of adequate skills, or because 
they are employed in sectors with low productivity. 
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VI. Policy Recommendations 
There are currently several initiatives to reform systems of vocational secondary and higher 
technical education in MENA, under the initiative of the World Bank and other lending 
institutions (see USAID, 2004 for a summary). As financial resources in developing countries are 
chronically scarce, not every educational sector can receive an equitable amount of funding and 
attention for planning.  The issue of particular contention, among many others, is about the kind 
(or level /stream) of education that the state should promote and prioritize. The current World 
Bank strategy (1995a) for educational development is to advise its client governments to allocate 
most of their resources and planning to basic and primary education sector as social rates of return 
to education (RORE), while generally high, are highest for basic and primary education (World 
Bank, 1980) and because the spillover effects for poverty reduction programs are particularly high 
for investment in basic and primary education (World Bank, 1995a).  
Despite the attempts to reform the vocational education system in Morocco and Egypt, the logic 
underlying the mechanisms of today’s education systems does not differ dramatically from the 
initial motivations that brought about the establishment of such systems during the colonial period 
(Lindgren, 2005). The primary objective at the time was to ‘produce’ diploma-holders that would 
eventually be absorbed in the public sector while, for instance, the policies led by concerns of 
universal coverage have been formulated in Egypt only in the 1990s (World Bank, 1995a). The 
white-collar focus of the Egyptian educational system has been reinforced in 1962 with the 
introduction of the graduate employment guarantee, which, together with the demographic 
explosion witnessed in the 20th century, increased the number of students that enrolled in general 
secondary education with the intent to pursue university level education. As a consequence, the 
labor market was not able to absorb the overhang of new graduates, and since the bulk of those 
graduates preferred to be employed in the government sector because of the higher wages first 
and then non-wage benefits at a later stage, many young entrants preferred to queue for a 
government job rather than seek private employment (Said, 2004). To counteract this 
phenomenon, the school system became very selective; only the top 50 percent of preparatory 
students were admitted into secondary education, and of those, only the top 30 percent could 
enroll in the general track, with the remaining two thirds channeled into the vocational track 
(Lindgren, 2005).12 Tracking students at such an early stage has had repercussions beyond the 
students’ ability to enter university (only the top 5 percent of vocational students enrolls in 
university). As suggested by Lindgren (2005), the schooling system over-focuses on the 
acquisition of a diploma, so that memorization and exam-related skills take precedence over those 
skills that are of direct relevance to a future potential job. At the same time, while university 
enrolment stands at 0,7 million (compared to 12,5 million in primary schools), university absorbs 
45 percent of the education budget (World Bank, 2005), thus expenditure for one university 
student is 17 times higher than for a primary school pupil (Lindgren, 2005). 
Morocco differs from the Egyptian case in that only 5.5 percent of students are enrolled in 
technical education (Diyen, (2004) refers to year 1999/2000). The scarce appeal of the Moroccan 
vocational system is dictated by the scarcity of vocational schools (for instance in the eastern part 
of Morocco, there is only one technical school) and by the fact that vocational education is 
instrumental to direct entry in the labor market only, given the inexistence of higher technical 
institutes, and considering that entrance to university is barred to vocational graduates since no 
degree is issued on completion of technical secondary education.  
The evident bias for general and university education has two major outcomes on vocational and 
technical education in Egypt. First, vocational education represents in the eyes of families and 
future employers a ‘second best option’, since the highest achievers among preparatory school 
students usually enter the general track. Secondly, vocational programs act as a vent to ease 
                                                          
12 Please refer to Appendix B: The Egyptian School System for recent data. 
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pressure off more academic paths, with subsequent neglect on the part of the authorities. The 
annual cost of a student in a technical secondary school is LE 500, a level extremely low if 
compared to LE 2500, the amount deemed necessary to provide moderate quality technical 
education in a private technical school (World Bank, 2005). In addition to their lower status 
within the educational hierarchy, vocational and technical schools suffer from other built-in 
inefficiencies. Students are channeled into 114 tracks that specialize in specific and often times 
obsolete skills and, especially because of the importance placed on the mere acquisition of 
credentials, young graduates enter the labor market poorly trained in skills that are outdated and 
too specific to adapt to newer opportunities. The results of our precedent analysis confirm this 
intuition: vocational graduates in the private sector have witnessed a low and declining rate of 
returns to education over the past two decades. At the same time vocational graduates have been 
hit the hardest by the shift towards less government involvement as their share among low earners 
increased from a high 33 percent in 1988 to a staggering 37 percent, when illiterate workers 
represent only 22 percent of low earners. 
The issue of quality and failure to teach appropriate skills is also present in Morocco where, for 
instance, there is not a single school where basic information technology skills are taught in the 
whole country (Diyen, 2004). The decline of national industries has also meant that skills that 
used to be relevant in the past have now to become updated, a phenomenon neglected in technical 
schools. A report by the Commission Spéciale de l’Education et la Formation states that 77 
percent of all students and 80 percent of teachers are dissatisfied with the schooling system. Faced 
with this abysmal situation the report calls for a reform of the secondary education system with a 
common first year and a two-year cycle leading to a diploma, allowing students to choose 
between a general and vocational track. The diploma will thus enable vocational students, at least 
theoretically, to enroll in university. For the vocational track, students will be taking modules 
relevant to their specialization in the second semester of their first year and, in order to give them 
the possibility to deepen their training, the reform envisages the establishment of higher technical 
schools. From the formulation of the reform plan in 1999 till 2002 very little has been achieved , 
therefore it remains to be seen how this reform will score in the coming year, as primary school 
coverage is far from universal in many regions, while disputes over whether Arabic, French or 
Berber should be the language of instruction are still present. 
The Egyptian authorities have already undertaken a series of projects to redress the inefficiencies 
of the vocational and technical education system. The complex governance mechanism that saw a 
sharing of responsibilities for all the different components of vocational education spread across 
the two ministries of education (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education) and six 
other ministries has been brought under the umbrella of the Supreme Council for Human 
Resource Development (SCHRD). While the attempt at improving coordination should be 
praised, the SCHRD has been, according to the World Bank (2005), largely ineffective since, for 
instance, the Ministry of Education has not been actively involved since 2002.  Another attempt at 
reducing the rigid top-down approach is represented by the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative that, based 
on the German model, seeks to promote a greater role for partnerships between training 
institutions and businesses. This initiative is flanked by a Technical Vocational Education and 
Training (TVET) Reform, financed by the European Union, which, starting from 2004, attempts 
to create partnerships between vocational schools, training institutions and businesses (World 
Bank, 2005). Changes have also been taking place with respect to the funding of vocational and 
technical education. The Skills Development Project (SDP), recently set up with the assistance of 
the World Bank, provides funding for vocational training directly to those businesses that invest 
in the development of their workforce, as opposed to funding the training institutions. A final 
initiative, modeled on the Singaporean and Malaysian experience (Kuruvilla, 1996), led to the 
establishment of a Training Finance Fund (TFF) that applies a 1 percent levy on profits of 
businesses with more than 10 employees. Those funds (estimated at LE 350 million a year) 
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should go towards vocational and technical training but, while this scheme has proved 
fundamental in the shift towards an improvements of vocational education in Singapore and 
Malaysia, Johanson and  Kanawaty (2001) identify possible problems arising with weak and still 
partially undefined governance and control mechanisms of the TFF. While all these initiatives 
deserve an appraisal for the establishment of mechanisms aimed at improving the performance of 
the vocational and technical education, one might argue that these measures will only address 
superficial aspects of the problem, without challenging the inherent contradictions of the system. 
Encouraging private businesses to invest in vocational education will be of little use if the trainees 
are still faced with social stigma that relegates them to low-paid jobs. An overhaul of vocational 
and technical education should concentrate on the two main objectives of any school system: 
promote social mobility and equity while being the cornerstone of economic and social 
development of society. Because the Egyptian VTET scores badly on these two fundamental 
aspects, we argue that the government should prioritize those elements in its policy making.  
Several studies carried out in countries with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity have focused on 
the relationship between the inclusion of minorities and vocational education. Despite the fact that 
Egypt and, to a lesser extent Morocco, are homogenous societies with respect to ethnicity, the 
education system furthers the social stratification of youth according to their economic 
background. Thus, the labor market segmentations on racial ground in countries like South Africa 
(Herman, 1995), the United States (Arum, 1998 and Oakes 1983) and Israel (Neuman and 
Ziederman, 2001) is perpetuated in Egypt and Morocco by the role of credentials as a signal of 
family background and education achievements. Our analysis underlined how low education 
achievements of fathers and mothers are correlated with their children’s choice of vocational 
education, thus low levels of parents’ education (usually associated with lower income) are 
passed on the next generations. Holders of a diploma from a vocational institute may signal two 
characteristics to potential employers: their (probably low) socio-economic background as well as 
low achievements in preparatory schools that tracked them in inefficient vocational paths, 
resulting in low levels of capital accumulation and low productivity. As a consequence, it may not 
be inappropriate to draw parallels with the analysis of segregation in ethnically heterogeneous 
societies. In her study of 25 schools, Oakes (1983) found that, non-white students were more 
likely to be enrolled in a set of vocational courses with lower potential earnings than their white 
counterpart. Neuman and Ziederman (2001) look at how the vocational and technical education 
has been used as a means to integrate new immigrants and disadvantaged minorities (like Israeli 
Arabs or Women) into Israeli society. The general finding of their previous study was that 
vocational education improves earnings only if the graduate is matched to a job related to her or 
his training. While women in vocational education (with the exception of those few women 
enrolled in technical programs as opposed to clerical ones) do not reap any benefit, Eastern Jews 
that graduated from a vocational school and were employed in matched occupations earn a higher 
wage premium than better off Western Jews, despite the fact that Eastern Jews are over 
represented in vocational education programs. These findings reinforce previous ones by Neuman 
and Ziederman (1999), that those vocational education programs that are tailored to the needs of 
the labor market do improve the prospects of vocational students. 
The argument put forward by Herman (1995) that, in order to keep academic secondary education 
as the exclusive domain of middle class children, societies opt for the segregation of less 
advantaged children in vocational education, does not differ excessively from the rationale at the 
basis of selectivity in the Egyptian school system.  Arum (1998) finds that in the US students in 
states were vocational education receives relatively more funds are more likely to finish their 
degrees and earn higher wages than the students in poorly funded state schools. These studies 
illustrate that social equality is not the only reason why Egypt and Morocco should rethink part of 
the structure of its education system; if we define schooling as culturally organized formulae for 
preparing children to participate in the status mobility system of their society (Ogbu, 1982 in 
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Herman, 1995) a more egalitarian access to education would result in a better allocation of 
resources to more apt students, rather than to those with higher exam scores which may have been 
dramatically raised recurring to expensive private tutoring (Lindgren, 2005). The example of Jews 
of Eastern origin and the findings in Arum (1998) indicates that when vocational education 
receives adequate attention in the form of funds and focus on relevant skills, it can be used by 
society to promote the advancement of individuals, with benefits being reaped by society as a 
whole. 
The spectacular growth of the Asian Tigers (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) is attributed to 
many reasons, one of them being the massive investment these states undertook in education and 
human capital during their period of catching-up. While the exact relationship between human 
capital (education) and economic growth is still open to debate, it is generally agreed that 
investment in education is a necessary condition for economic growth (Psacharopoulos, 1988; 
Schultz, 1988, see also Pritchett, 1999 for diverging evidence). Several analysis of the success 
stories of Asian economies advocate in favor of such a drastic overhaul of the system led by 
efficiency concerns (McKormick, 1988; Kuruvilla, 1996; Tzannatos and Johnes, 1997; Green et 
al., 1999; Gill et al., 2000; Lynch, 1994). In a study on the relationship between the correlation 
between industrialization strategies and industrial relations and human resources policy goals, 
Kuruvilla (1996) illustrate how the shift between an import substitution development policy to a 
cost-driven export promotion first and a high-tech export oriented policy later was matched with 
drastic changes in education policy and industrial relations in Singapore and Malaysia. Faced with 
the rise of low cost competitors, Singapore and Malaysia invested heavily in the development of a 
strong, competent workforce, outlining a strategy that was consistent with the development goals 
envisaged. Seen as the cornerstone of the country’s development strategy and adequately funded 
by the state, vocational schools started attracting a higher number of students, which were then 
absorbed in new, export-oriented technology sectors. The increase in demand of the part of 
students and employers led to a mushrooming of private centers, thus decreasing the financial 
burden on the public system (AbdelKarim, 1997; Kurovilla, 1996). This marked a watershed in 
the perception of vocational education from a strait-jacket for low-achievers to a powerful vehicle 
to employment and empowerment. All these factors triggered self-reinforcing mechanisms that 
resulted in high returns to vocational education that, still today, are more of an exception than a 
norm elsewhere in the world. 
Taking our analysis of the current challenges facing Morocco and Egypt as a starting point, and 
the experiences of many South-East Asian economies as a reference point, we can conclude that 
current and future reforms should be built around three key aspects: 
 Quality: increasing quality does not only focus on increasing spending. Governance systems 
ought to be simplified and made more transparent, flexible and participative. Increasing 
spending might prove difficult in Egypt, where the system enrolls more than 500 thousand 
students already; while in Morocco the limited size poses problems because investment in 
equipment are spread across too small a number of students. A key strategy could be to begin 
investment on a smaller pool of school, thus improving the perception of quality that could 
have knock-down effects on perspective students and employers.  
 Equality: as long as vocational and technical education remains a second-best alternative, the 
best students will be channeled into general education, even if the current selective system 
based on exam results were to be dismantled. At the same time, very slight possibilities to 
pursue higher education (whether at university or in higher technical schools) will mean that 
few bright students will opt for vocational education, since it would limit their future 
alternatives.  
 Public-private partnerships: such partnerships will be beneficial because they decrease the 
burden on public funding, while ensuring that training is matched with the need of the labor 
markets. 
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Of course in a situation of dire infrastructure and very limited resources like in the case of Egypt, 
one cannot expect the system to pull itself up by its bootstraps. Nonetheless, attention should be 
paid to the self-reinforcing mechanism built-in our logic. More quality will convince families and 
employers to invest in vocational education, while private investment can definitely boost quality. 
Perhaps the hardest task of all will be to push reform of vocational education higher in the 
development agenda of both Egypt and Morocco. 
VII. Conclusions and Future Expansions 
The socioeconomic changes witnessed by Egypt and Morocco have had an adverse impact on the 
achievements of vocational graduates. Family background remained one of the crucial 
determinants of educational choice, especially in Egypt, meaning that children are still likely to 
replicate the educational choice of their parents. As labor markets became more polarized, 
vocational graduates seem to have been the least favored group both in the public and private 
sector, mainly because of the declining role of the public sector and because of the private 
sector’s preference for males with post-secondary education. As a result in Egypt, low-earners are 
twice more likely to be vocational graduates than illiterate.  
A possible explanation of these trends could be that a mechanism of path-dependency locks a 
specific category of workers in a secondary job market. Questions of opportunity cost and an 
underestimation of the value of education, coupled with dismal wage prospects and structural 
barriers, reduce significantly the return to vocational education, setting a vicious circle that 
inevitably co-opts younger generations. These dynamics deserve closer examination as ELMPS 
2006 data suggest that graduates of vocational school constitute the biggest and fastest growing 
group among new entrants in the labor market. 
Future expansions of our research should look closely at the internal dynamics of the sub-market 
for vocational education graduates, by further expanding previous observations to the new 2006 
data set. In addition to that, our findings should pave the way to future reforms of vocational 
education aimed at addressing structural as well as operational imbalances, so that vocational 
education programs become increasingly more tailored at the needs of MENA labor markets, and 
society at large. In supporting our arguments, we will draw on empirical evidence from aggregate 
indicators and cross-sectional data on vocational education and labor market outcomes in MENA 
and East Asian countries (compiled from a variety of country specific, regional and international 
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Chart (3) Changes in the Rate of Returns to Education, Egypt, 1988-1998 
 



















Chart (4) Rate of Returns to Education in the Government Sector, Egypt, 1988-1998-2006. 
 

























Chart (5) Rate of Returns to Education in the Private Sector, Egypt, 1988-1998-2006 
 


















Chart (6) Wage Inequality as Measured by the Gini Coefficient, Egypt, 1988-1998-2006 
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Chart (7) Evolution of the Wage Premium of Median Workers According to Level of 
Education, Egypt, 1988-1998-2006 
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Chart (8) Share of Total Low-earners According to Education Achievements, Egypt, 1988-
1998-2006 

































Table (1): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Multinomial Logit of 
















Alexandria &Suez Can. 0.093 0.291 0.134 0.341 0.105 0.306 
Urban Lower Egypt 0.140 0.347 0.158 0.365 0.125 0.330 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.099 0.299 0.132 0.339 0.079 0.270 
Rural Lower Egypt 0.263 0.440 0.179 0.384 0.235 0.424 
Rural Upper Egypt 0.175 0.380 0.100 0.300 0.169 0.374 
Mother_Read & Wrt 0.080 0.272 0.146 0.353 0.084 0.277 
Mother_Primary 0.021 0.143 0.030 0.172 0.024 0.154 
Mother_Second. 0.002 0.044 0.004 0.062 0.001 0.033 
Mother_Univ. 0.003 0.054 0.005 0.072 0.006 0.077 
Father_Read & Wrt 0.260 0.439 0.371 0.483 0.255 0.436 
Father_Primary 0.051 0.219 0.076 0.266 0.059 0.236 
Father_Second. 0.007 0.081 0.013 0.113 0.006 0.077 
Father_Univ 0.023 0.150 0.050 0.219 0.026 0.158 
No.Siblings 0-6 Yrs 1.188 1.444 1.032 1.266 1.101 1.380 
NoSiblings >6 Yrs 4.706 2.893 3.830 2.535 4.459 2.726 
Log Real Hourly Wage .449 .761 .605 .659 .420 .730 
Observations 9406  2278  1853  





Table (2): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Multinomial Logit of 
School Choice for Private Sector Workers; Egypt 1998 

















Alexandria&SuezCan 0.126 0.331 0.139 0.346 0.121 0.326 
Urban Lower Egypt 0.162 0.368 0.177 0.381 0.144 0.351 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.172 0.378 0.227 0.419 0.139 0.346 
Rural Lower Egypt 0.199 0.399 0.165 0.372 0.210 0.407 
Rural Upper Egypt 0.145 0.352 0.086 0.280 0.144 0.351 
Mother_Read&Wrt 0.132 0.339 0.197 0.398 0.128 0.335 
Mother_Primary 0.009 0.092 0.014 0.117 0.009 0.094 
Mother_Second. 0.005 0.069 0.009 0.094 0.006 0.074 
Mother_Univ. 0.005 0.069 0.005 0.070 0.004 0.067 
Father_Read&Wrt 0.325 0.468 0.394 0.489 0.300 0.458 
Father_Primary 0.033 0.179 0.045 0.207 0.023 0.151 
Father_Second. 0.012 0.108 0.022 0.147 0.008 0.086 
Father_Univ 0.042 0.200 0.061 0.239 0.028 0.166 
No. Siblings 0-6 Yrs 0.749 1.070 0.748 0.985 0.802 1.063 
No. Siblings >6 Yrs 4.297 2.471 3.627 2.188 4.308 2.469 
Log Real Hourly Wage .277 .678 .365 .649 .196 .680 
Observations 8192  1943  823  




Table (3): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Multinomial Logit of 
School Choice for Private Sector Workers; Morocco 1991 and 1999 

















Hamra 0.146 0.353 0.172 0.378 0.144 0.352 
Guelmime Es-Semara 0.136 0.342 0.111 0.315 0.137 0.344 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 0.146 0.353 0.195 0.397 0.143 0.350 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hssen 0.148 0.355 0.133 0.340 0.149 0.356 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 0.153 0.360 0.139 0.346 0.154 0.361 
Tensift Al Haouz 0.139 0.346 0.108 0.311 0.142 0.349 
Mother_Read&Write 0.007 0.086 0.010 0.099 0.007 0.085 
Father_Read&Wrt 0.811 0.391 0.661 0.474 0.824 0.381 
Father_Primary 0.143 0.350 0.244 0.430 0.134 0.341 
Father_Prep 0.028 0.166 0.050 0.219 0.027 0.161 
Father_Second 0.009 0.096 0.022 0.145 0.008 0.091 
Father_Univ. 0.003 0.055 0.005 0.073 0.003 0.053 
No.Siblings 0-6 Yrs 1.093 1.298 0.866 1.034 1.108 1.312 
No.Siblings >6 Yrs 6.304 3.011 5.035 2.630 6.388 3.016 
Log Average Weekly Wages 5.535 .895 6.072 .781 5.184 .767 
Observations 5773  184  163  





















El Hamra 0.013 0.111 0.067 0.251 0.009 0.096 
Guelmime Es-Semara 0.023 0.151 0.044 0.204 0.022 0.148 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 0.092 0.289 0.066 0.249 0.093 0.291 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni 
Hssen 0.061 0.239 0.047 0.211 0.062 0.240 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 0.051 0.219 0.057 0.233 0.050 0.218 
Tensift Al Haouz 0.095 0.293 0.062 0.242 0.097 0.296 
Oriental 0.071 0.257 0.050 0.219 0.072 0.259 
G.Casablanca 0.129 0.335 0.150 0.358 0.127 0.333 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer 0.087 0.282 0.151 0.359 0.083 0.277 
Doukala Abda 0.064 0.245 0.051 0.221 0.065 0.246 
Tadla Azilal 0.052 0.221 0.028 0.164 0.053 0.224 
Meknes Tafil 0.074 0.261 0.058 0.235 0.074 0.262 
Fes-Boulemane 0.050 0.217 0.044 0.204 0.050 0.218 
Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taounate 0.055 0.228 0.041 0.197 0.056 0.230 
Tanger-Tetouan 0.075 0.263 0.037 0.188 0.077 0.266 
Mother_Read&Write 0.005 0.073 0.010 0.098 0.005 0.071 
Mother_Primary 0.014 0.117 0.029 0.168 0.013 0.112 
Mother_LwrSecnd. 0.003 0.059 0.006 0.074 0.003 0.057 
Father_Read&Wrt 0.762 0.426 0.634 0.482 0.771 0.420 
Father_Primary 0.139 0.346 0.215 0.411 0.133 0.340 
Father_Prep 0.051 0.220 0.086 0.281 0.048 0.215 
Father_Second 0.016 0.127 0.031 0.173 0.015 0.123 
Father_Univ. 0.010 0.098 0.020 0.139 0.009 0.095 
No.Siblings 0-6 Yrs 0.915 1.146 0.822 0.986 0.920 1.154 
No.Siblings >6 Yrs 6.309 2.769 5.223 2.463 6.372 2.773 
Log Average Weekly 
Wages 5.211 1.176 6.306 .695 4.972 1.092 
Observations 9502   441   1033   
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
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Table (4): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Multinomial Logit Estimation of 
Schooling Choice, Egypt, 1988 and 1998 
 1988, Gen+Univ 1988,Voc. 1998, 
Gen+Univ 
1998, Voc. 
Region (Cairo=Ref.)     
Alexandria&Suez Can. -0.002 -0.016 -0.019 0.028 
 (0.15) (1.18) (1.51) (1.85) 
Urban Lower Egypt -0.011 -0.004 -0.063 0.084 
 (1.13) (0.32) (5.08)** (6.06)** 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.009 0.008 -0.006 0.033 
 (0.87) (0.65) (0.50) (2.29)* 
Rural Lower Egypt -0.058 -0.005 -0.101 0.081 
 (5.50)** (0.38) (7.13)** (5.34)** 
Rural Upper Egypt -0.100 0.025 -0.111 0.022 
 (6.85)** (1.64) (5.78)** (1.07) 
Mother_Read&Wrt 0.115 -0.013 0.116 -0.019 
 (12.83)** (1.20) (11.73)** (1.66) 
Mother_Primary 0.133 -0.015 0.151 0.012 
 (8.13)** (0.71) (4.55)** (0.33) 
Mother_Second. 1.183 0.508 0.237 -0.046 
 (10.16)** (5.00)** (4.01)** (0.67) 
Mother_Univ. 0.012 0.041 0.195 -0.155 
 (0.25) (0.61) (2.78)** (1.54) 
Father_Read&Wrt 0.043 0.034 0.034 0.028 
 (5.89)** (4.09)** (3.92)** (2.95)** 
Father_Primary 0.064 0.038 0.042 0.034 
 (5.53)** (2.83)** (2.19)* (1.60) 
Father_Second. 0.228 -0.096 0.251 -0.070 
 (6.94)** (2.06)* (7.66)** (1.65) 
Father_Univ 0.261 -0.120 0.263 -0.041 
 (12.05)** (4.05)** (13.61)** (1.71) 
Siblings 0-6 Yrs -0.009 -0.003 -0.012 0.031 
 (2.65)** (0.80) (2.76)** (6.98)** 
Siblings >6 Yrs -0.010 0.004 -0.017 0.016 
 (6.41)** (2.34)* (7.59)** (2.61)** 
Observations 9406 9406 8192 8192 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1988 and 1998 Egypt LFSS and ELMS 
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Table (5): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Multinomial Logit Estimation of 
Schooling Choice, Morocco, 1991 and 1999 
 1991, Gen+Univ 1991,Voc. 1999, Gen+Univ 1999, Voc. 
Regions(Oued Ed-Dahab-
Lagouira=Ref) 
    
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia  -0.001 -0.005 0.142 -0.070 
 (0.07) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) 
Guelmime Es-Semara 0.001 0.005 0.104 -0.065 
 (0.14) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00) 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 0.008 -0.004 -0.140 0.084 
 (1.03) (0.55) (0.00) (5.38)** 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hssen 0.017 -0.006 0.093 -0.065 
 (2.36)* (0.82) (0.00) (0.00) 
Chaouia-Ouardigha -0.006 -0.003 -0.127 0.090 
 (0.66) (0.32) (0.00) (5.42)** 
Tensift Al Haouz -0.006 0.003 -0.146 0.085 
 (0.69) (0.32) (0.00) (5.42)** 
Oriental   -0.154 0.094 
   (0.00) (5.51)** 
G.Casablanca   -0.134 0.090 
   (0.00) (5.47)** 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer   -0.122 0.088 
   (0.00) (5.40)** 
Doukala Abda   0.098 -0.065 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Tadla Azilal   -0.196 0.096 
   (0.00) (5.62)** 
Meknes Tafil   -0.130 0.084 
   (0.00) (5.33)** 
Fes-Boulemane   -0.149 0.089 
   (0.00) (5.48)** 
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate   0.094 -0.064 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Tanger-Tetouan   -0.160 0.086 
   (0.00) (5.79)** 
Mother_Read&Write 0.021 -0.011 0.234 -0.156 
 (1.74) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mother_Primary   0.023 0.000 
   (0.00) (0.01) 
Mother_LwrSecnd.   0.294 -0.162 
   (0.00) (6.12)** 
Father_Read&Wrt -0.126 0.352 0.002 -0.005 
 (5.78)** (7.79)** (0.00) (1.11) 
Father_Primary -0.100 0.351 0.028 -0.002 
 (4.67)** (7.55)** (0.00) (0.41) 
Father_Prep -0.068 0.340 0.049 -0.004 
 (3.20)** (7.20)** (0.00) (0.79) 
Father_Second -0.054 0.329 0.071 -0.007 
 (2.43)* (6.89)** (0.00) (1.23) 
Father_Univ. -0.075 0.349 0.079 -0.005 
 (3.00)** (7.57)** (0.00) (0.81) 
Siblings 0-6 Yrs -0.007 0.002 -0.004 -0.000 
 (3.00)** (0.78) (0.00) (0.51) 
Siblings >6 Yrs -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
 (4.98)** (0.48) (0.00) (1.52) 
Observations 5773 5773 9502 9502 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 




Table (6): Selectivity Corrected Wage Equations by Sector of Employment, Egypt, 1988 and 
1998 
Log Hourly Wages Public, 88 Private, 88 Public, 98 Private, 98 
General+University 0.895 0.467 0.880 0.544 
 (0.033)** (0.060)** (0.035)** (0.076)** 
Vocational 0.579 0.154 0.503 0.182 
 (0.033)** (0.051)** (0.037)** (0.076)* 
Experience 0.067 0.063 0.052 0.026 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.010)** 
Experience Sq. -0.076 -0.110 -0.045 -0.092 
 (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.017)** 
Regions: (Cairo=Ref)     
Alexandria -0.101 -0.008 -0.036 0.078 
 (0.036)** (0.058) (0.039) (0.075) 
Urban Lower Egypt -0.150 -0.105 -0.243 -0.002 
 (0.034)** (0.055) (0.037)** (0.076) 
Urban Upper Egypt -0.224 -0.177 -0.192 -0.169 
 (0.036)** (0.066)** (0.036)** (0.081)* 
Rural Lower Egypt -0.265 -0.059 -0.302 0.011 
 (0.034)** (0.049) (0.039)** (0.079) 
Urban Upper Egypt. -0.258 -0.032 -0.290 -0.221 
 (0.042)** (0.053) (0.051)** (0.085)** 
Lambda -0.055 -0.021 0.000 -0.062 
 (0.019)** (0.013) (0.000) (0.049) 
Constant -0.627 -0.040 -0.886 0.069 
 (0.055)** (0.067) (0.079)** (0.145) 
Observations 2278 1853 1943 823 
R-squared 0.40 0.25 0.37 0.23 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level Standard errors in parentheses 




















Table (7): Selectivity Corrected Wage Equations by Sector of Employment, Morocco, 1991 
and 1999 
Log Hourly Wages Public, 88 Private, 88 Public, 98 Private, 98 
General+University 0.956 1.477 0.678 0.927 
 (0.203)** (0.657)* (0.070)** (0.154)** 
Vocational 0.379 1.456 0.740 1.448 
 (0.180)* (0.398)** (0.173)** (0.344)** 
Experience 0.074 0.098 0.111 0.092 
 (0.027)** (0.030)** (0.021)** (0.012)** 
Experience Sq. -0.120 -0.130 -0.163 -0.140 
 (0.046)* (0.020)** (0.032)** (0.020)** 
Regions (Oued Ed-
Dahab-lagouira=Ref) 
    
Laayoune-Boujdour-
Sakia El Hamra 
-0.055 -0.508 -0.268 0.777 
 (0.317) (0.269) (0.195) (0.446) 
Guelmim Es-Semara 0.087 -0.476 -0.392 0.000 
 (0.321) (0.251) (0.199)* (0.000) 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 0.180 -0.641 -0.413 -0.056 
 (0.287) (0.207)** (0.176)* (0.306) 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni 
Hssen 
0.043 -0.360 -0.413 -0.024 
 (0.346) (0.277) (0.186)* (0.315) 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 0.040 0.445 -0.399 -0.042 
 (0.293) (0.314) (0.181)* (0.319) 
Tensift Al Haouz 0.260 -0.500 -0.310 0.136 
 (0.333) (0.254) (0.184) (0.311) 
Oriental   -0.605 0.282 
   (0.181)** (0.310) 
G.Casablanca   -0.211 0.720 
   (0.157) (0.294)* 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-
Zaer 
  -0.444 0.269 
   (0.151)** (0.300) 
Doukala Abda   -0.334 -0.184 
   (0.199) (0.311) 
Tadla Azilal   -0.404 0.000 
   (0.209) (0.000) 
Meknes Tafil   -0.317 -0.416 
   (0.169) (0.303) 
Fes-Boulemane   -0.523 -0.259 
   (0.194)** (0.318) 
Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taounate 
  -0.576 -0.546 
   (0.196)** (0.317) 
Tanger-Tetouan   -0.615 0.379 
   (0.192)** (0.300) 
Lambda -0.087 -0.066 -0.108 -0.172 
 (0.100) (0.087) (0.066) (0.052)** 
Constant 5.113 5.648 4.968 4.414 
 (0.465)** (0.498)** (0.370)** (0.345)** 
Observations 184 163 441 1033 
R-Squared 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.30 
* Significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level Standard errors in parentheses 

























Egypt     
1998, Public vs. Private Sector 6.7 34 67 4.4 
1988, Public vs. Private Sector 18.9 39 61 11.5 
      
Morocco     
1999, Public vs. Private Sector 111.3 48.8 51.2 57.0 
1991, Public vs. Private Sector 80.6 51.2 48.8 39.3 






Table (9): Changes in Private Rates of Return between 1998 and 1988 by Sector, Egypt 
Males   
Education Level Public 98-88 Private 98-88 
Primary to Read & Write 6,7% -3,0%* 
Preparatory to Primary -9,9% -11,1%* 
Secondary to Preparatory 3,1% 14,8%* 
University to Secondary -7,2% -18,8%* 
   
Females   
Education Level Public 98-88 Private 98-88 
Primary to Read & Write 40,1%* 28,5%* 
Preparatory to Primary -24,1% 5,1%* 
Secondary to Preparatory 14,1% -2,8%* 
University to Secondary -4,0% 106,4%* 












Table (10) Percentage Differences in Private Rates of Return By Sector, Morocco, 1991 and 
1999  
Males      
Education Level Public, 91 Public, 99 Private, 91* Private, 99  
Primary to R&W 14.60 4.87 6.60 0.83  
Prep. To Primary 10.97 10.00 8.50 11.80  
Sec. to Prep. 9.37 8.97 22.43 19.20  
Univ. to Sec. 25.85 4.93 25.08 8.58  
      
      
Females      
Education Level Public, 91 Public, 99 Private, 91* Private, 99*  
Primary to R&W 12.70 18.13 8.80 10.10  
Prep. To Primary 12.17 13.53 23.20 19.90  
Sec. to Prep. 1.87 4.77 1.57 13.13  
Univ. to Sec. 14.18 13.13 25.75 0.58  
* Corresponds to insignificant coefficients. Shaded areas correspond to insignificant coefficients. 
















Table (11): Selectivity Corrected Quantile Regression Results, 1988 and 1998 
Selectivity Corrected Quantile Regression Results, 1988 and 1998
1988 1998
COEFFICIENT 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Experience 0.088*** 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Experience Sq. -0.133*** -0.101*** -0.075*** -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.031**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)
Region (Cairo=base)
Alex and Suez Cnl 0.054 -0.036 -0.043 -0.106** -0.192*** 0.076 -0.006 -0.054 -0.023 -0.072
(0.051) (0.034) (0.028) (0.048) (0.055) (0.060) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.059)
Urban Lower Egypt 0.051 -0.114*** -0.124*** -0.167*** -0.222*** 0.044 -0.085** -0.222*** -0.236*** -0.350***
(0.048) (0.032) (0.026) (0.045) (0.051) (0.058) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.056)
Urban Upper Egypt -0.055 -0.127*** -0.159*** -0.221*** -0.270*** -0.028 -0.075** -0.224*** -0.243*** -0.340***
(0.053) (0.036) (0.029) (0.051) (0.058) (0.057) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.054)
Rural Lower Egypt 0.026 -0.111*** -0.152*** -0.172*** -0.196*** -0.114* -0.111*** -0.248*** -0.309*** -0.372***
(0.053) (0.035) (0.028) (0.048) (0.054) (0.065) (0.040) (0.043) (0.045) (0.060)
Rural Upper Egypt 0.145** -0.029 -0.125*** -0.223*** -0.328*** -0.122 -0.201*** -0.346*** -0.258*** -0.412***
(0.058) (0.038) (0.031) (0.054) (0.060) (0.077) (0.047) (0.051) (0.054) (0.071)
Levels of Education (LT Secondary=base)
Secondary General 0.444*** 0.453*** 0.508*** 0.328*** 0.249** 0.849*** 0.658*** 0.501*** 0.529*** 0.586***
(0.100) (0.066) (0.054) (0.093) (0.102) (0.149) (0.097) (0.106) (0.112) (0.144)
Secondary Vocational-3 yrs 0.475*** 0.405*** 0.204*** 0.145*** 0.115** 0.437*** 0.343*** 0.275*** 0.199*** 0.179***
(0.041) (0.027) (0.022) (0.040) (0.046) (0.047) (0.030) (0.034) (0.038) (0.052)
Secondary Vocational-5 yrs 0.595*** 0.570*** 0.385*** 0.245*** 0.180** 0.657*** 0.602*** 0.483*** 0.342*** 0.246***
(0.073) (0.049) (0.041) (0.071) (0.081) (0.067) (0.042) (0.047) (0.051) (0.072)
Univeristy+ 0.923*** 0.767*** 0.588*** 0.513*** 0.604*** 0.903*** 0.743*** 0.673*** 0.623*** 0.582***
(0.050) (0.034) (0.027) (0.047) (0.054) (0.053) (0.033) (0.038) (0.041) (0.057)
Selection Term -3.781* -2.870** -1.754** -3.391** -2.640* -0.926** -1.291*** -0.607*** -9.674*** -3.518***
(1.932) (1.318) (-0.737) (-1.467) (-1.792) (0.045) (0.027) (0.281) (2.901) (0.285)
Constant -2.817 -2.441 -0.686 -2.611 -2.334 -7.293** -4.219** -5.330*** -5.501** -5.425*
(2.889) (1.797) (1.463) (2.383) (2.631) (3.326) (1.849) (2.036) (2.153) (2.797)
Observations 4315 4315 4315 4315 4315 2776 2776 2776 2776 2776
. . . . . . . . . .
Standard errors in parenthes




Table (12): Selectivity Corrected Wage Equations by Sector of Employment, Egypt, 1988 
and 1998 
Log Hourly Wages Public, 88 Private, 88 Public, 98 Private, 98 
General+University 0.895 0.467 0.880 0.544 
 (0.033)** (0.060)** (0.035)** (0.076)** 
Vocational 0.579 0.154 0.503 0.182 
 (0.033)** (0.051)** (0.037)** (0.076)* 
Experience 0.067 0.063 0.052 0.026 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.010)** 
Experience Sq. -0.076 -0.110 -0.045 -0.092 
 (0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.017)** 
Regions: (Cairo=Ref)     
Alexandria -0.101 -0.008 -0.036 0.078 
 (0.036)** (0.058) (0.039) (0.075) 
Urban Lower Egypt -0.150 -0.105 -0.243 -0.002 
 (0.034)** (0.055) (0.037)** (0.076) 
Urban Upper Egypt -0.224 -0.177 -0.192 -0.169 
 (0.036)** (0.066)** (0.036)** (0.081)* 
Rural Lower Egypt -0.265 -0.059 -0.302 0.011 
 (0.034)** (0.049) (0.039)** (0.079) 
Urban Upper Egypt. -0.258 -0.032 -0.290 -0.221 
 (0.042)** (0.053) (0.051)** (0.085)** 
Lambda -0.055 -0.021 0.000 -0.062 
 (0.019)** (0.013) (0.000) (0.049) 
Constant -0.627 -0.040 -0.886 0.069 
 (0.055)** (0.067) (0.079)** (0.145) 
Observations 2278 1853 1943 823 
R-squared 0.40 0.25 0.37 0.23 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1988 LFSS and 1998 ELMS. 
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Table (13): Selectivity Corrected Wage Equations by Sector of Employment, Morocco, 1991 
and 1999 
Log Weekly Wages Public, 91 Private, 91 Public, 99 Private,99 
General+University 0.956 1.477 0.678 0.927 
 (0.203)** (0.657)* (0.070)** (0.154)** 
Vocational 0.379 1.456 0.740 1.448 
 (0.180)* (0.398)** (0.173)** (0.344)** 
Experience 0.074 0.098 0.111 0.092 
 (0.027)** (0.030)** (0.021)** (0.012)** 
Experience Sq. -0.120 -0.130 -0.163 -0.140 
 (0.046)* (0.020)** (0.032)** (0.020)** 
Regions (Oued Ed-Dahab-Lagouira=Ref)     
Laayoune-Boujdour-Sakia El Hamra -0.055 -0.508 -0.268 0.777 
 (0.317) (0.269) (0.195) (0.446) 
Guelmime Es-Semara 0.087 -0.476 -0.392 0.000 
 (0.321) (0.251) (0.199)* (0.000) 
Souss-Massa-Daraa 0.180 -0.641 -0.413 -0.056 
 (0.287) (0.207)** (0.176)* (0.306) 
Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hssen 0.043 -0.360 -0.413 -0.024 
 (0.346) (0.277) (0.186)* (0.315) 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 0.040 0.445 -0.399 -0.042 
 (0.293) (0.314) (0.181)* (0.319) 
Tensift Al Haouz 0.260 -0.500 -0.310 0.136 
 (0.333) (0.254) (0.184) (0.311) 
Oriental   -0.605 0.282 
   (0.181)** (0.310) 
G.Casablanca   -0.211 0.720 
   (0.157) (0.294)* 
Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer   -0.444 0.269 
   (0.151)** (0.300) 
Doukala Abda   -0.334 -0.184 
   (0.199) (0.311) 
Tadla Azilal   -0.404 0.000 
   (0.209) (0.000) 
Meknes Tafil   -0.317 -0.416 
   (0.169) (0.303) 
Fes-Boulemane   -0.523 -0.259 
   (0.194)** (0.318) 
Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate   -0.576 -0.546 
   (0.196)** (0.317) 
Tanger-Tetouan   -0.615 0.379 
   (0.192)** (0.300) 
Lambda -0.087 -0.066 -0.108 -0.172 
 (0.100) (0.087) (0.066) (0.052)** 
Constant 5.113 5.648 4.968 4.414 
 (0.465)** (0.498)** (0.370)** (0.345)** 
Observations 184 163 441 1033 
R-Squared 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.30 
* Significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
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Table (14) Gender and Sector Wage Differentials, Egypt, 1988-2006 
Source: Calculated from log hourly wage regressions based on the 1988 Labor Force Sample Survey, 1998 Egyptian  






crude corrected crude corrected crude corrected
Sector Wage Differentials
Males 
Government-private 0.20 -0.19 0.11 -0.22 0.27 -0.01
Public enterprise-private 0.40 0.03 0.37 0.06 0.49 0.27
Females 
Government-private -0.56 0.59 0.50 0.10 0.83 0.33
Public enterprise-private -0.46 0.48 0.79 0.13 0.77 0.33
 Gender Wage Differentials (Female-Male) 
Government -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.03
Public enterprise -0.24 -0.16 0.05 -0.20 -0.07 -0.23
Private Sector -0.66 -0.43 -0.34 -0.39 -0.35 -0.21
1988 1998 2006
Source: Calculated from log hourly wage regressions  based on the 1988 Labour Force Sample Survey, 1998 Egyptian 
Labour Sample Survey and 2006 Egypt Panel Labor Market Survey (see appendix).
Note:  Crude sector and gender wage differentials are simply differences in the means of log hourly wages. Corrected 
sector wage differentials are calculated as the difference between predicted log hourly wages for public sector sector 
employees using the public sector wage equation and their predicted log hourly wages using the private sector equation 
(expressed as a proportion of the former). Similarly, corrected Gender wage differentials are the difference between 













APPENDIX A: Quantile Regressions, Wage Decomposition and Measures of Inequality 
A.1 Selectivity Corrected Quantile Regression 
Quantile methods are also preferred over, or along side, least square estimation due to the higher 
degree of robustness in estimation, reduced sensitivity to outlying observations (Koenker and 
Bassett, 1978; Deaton, 1997).   The Quantile regression method can be written in equation form 
as the qth quantile of the conditional log distribution of wages as a linear function of the 
regression variable, X:   
Quantile q (lnw|x) = X βq                                                    







xwqxwq ββ −−+− ∑∑
><
 
Where r is the residual, qi xwr β'ln −=       the gender pay gap is calculated as follows, 
*lnln fqfqq wwG −=           
where ln wfq is average log hourly wage females and ln wfq* is the log hourly wage computed by 
multiplying the coefficients for the male equation times the average characteristics of the female 
workers. 
Quantile regressions therefore, provide snapshots of different points of a conditional distribution. 
They therefore constitute a parsimonious way of describing the whole distribution. We test the 
hypothesis that wage dispersions do indeed vary across educational levels, thus resulting in an 
impact of schooling upon the wage distribution, through its within-levels channel schooling-
related earnings increment. The log wage equation may be estimated conditional on a given 
specification and then calculated at various percentiles (like for example the 10th, the 25th, the 
75th or the 90th).  
A2: Oaxaca-Blinder Method 
Our earning estimates above reveal differences in wage setting and returns to education by sector 
of ownership in both Egypt and Morocco. Besides estimating “sheep skin effects”, we formally 
study hypotheses relating to the incidence of pay differentiation by sector. In order to ascertain 
whether changes in returns to education translated into altering overall wage inequality in the 
Egyptian and Moroccan labor markets, we further decompose the sector wage gap into 
components attributable to pure pay premium between sectors as opposed to differences in 
characteristics.   
The overall sample selection adjusted wage differential between public and private workers can 
be decomposed into different components: (1) a portion due to differences in average 
characteristics, such as experience, region and education. (2) a portion due to differences in the 
parameters of the wage function, caused by labor market discrimination and other omitted factors, 
and (3) a portion due to differences in selectivity bias. Adopting the methodology, which was first 
utilized by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), the differences in the logarithmic wages between 
public and private, is written as: 
WWW vp lnlnln −=∆          (6) 
Where P refers to public sector and v to private sector the operator ∆  represents the mean 
difference between public and private wages. First, separate wage equations are estimated for 
public and private workers. The estimated wage equations are then used to decompose the 
observed wage differential between public and private workers into components due to personal 
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characteristics, to parameters and to sample selectivity bias. If the average observed log wage for 
type j worker is ji ijij /nlnW  Wln ∑= . The average observed characteristics, ji ij nX   X /∑=  and the 
average sample selectivity bias term,  ∑=
−
i jij nX  /λ  where nj is the number of individuals in a j 
group. In this case, j=public (p), private (v). Suppose that β̂ p  is the competitive wage and that 
private sector workers are compensated at the same wage as public sector workers. Then, the 
predicted mean wage for private workers using competitive wages is given by β̂ p X v . In other 




⎛ −+++−=− λδλδββββ vvppvvvpvpppvp XXXXWW ˆˆˆˆˆˆlnln                    




⎛ −+−= λδλδβββ vvppvvpvpp XXX ˆˆˆˆˆ      (7) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation is the differences in the endowments of wage-
determining characteristics (X’s) between the public and private sector workers, evaluated 
according to the public sector pay structure ( β̂ p ). This portion can also be interpreted as the wage 
gain private sector workers would experience if they had the same characteristics on the average 
as public sector workers. The second term on the right-hand side is the portion due to differences 
in pay structure (coefficients, s'β
)
) between public and private sector workers. It is the wage gain 
private sector workers would experience, given their mean characteristics, if they were 
compensated as public sector workers. The last term represents the wage differential attributed to 
sample selection bias.  Accordingly, we run into an index number problem (Oaxaca, 1973; Jones, 
1983). The problem arises when heterogeneous group of characteristics (X variables) are summed 
with two sets of wages (public and private). Following the approach employed by Reimers 
(1983), which uses an unweighted average of each type of worker’s coefficients, the wage 
differential can be decomposed as:  














⎛ +−=− λδλδββββ vvppvpvpvvpvpvp XXXXXWW ˆˆˆˆˆˆ 5.05.0lnln
     (8) 
In our discussion in Section V.C we followed the literature and use the previous methodology to 
sort out the differences in wages between public and private sectors that are due to endowments 
and those that are due to discrimination, i.e. the explained from the unexplained. We grouped 
differences due to discrimination and differences due to selection bias in one “unexplained” 
factor.  
A3. Standard Measures of Inequality 
It is important to clarify the differences between the different measures of inequality presented.13 
The most commonly reported statistical measure of inequality is usually ‘the standard deviation’, 
which is a measure of how far each observation is from the mean. It is not, however, a good 
measure of inequality because if everyone’s income doubles, (or there is inflation), the standard 
deviation will also double. If the standard deviation is however standardized by dividing it by the 
mean of the distribution, we obtain the second measure, namely ‘the coefficient of variation’, 
which does not suffer from this problem. A third measure is ‘the Gini coefficient’ which 
graphically is defined as the area between the Lorenz Curve (which graphs the cumulative 
fraction of income versus the cumulative fraction of the population arranged in ascending order) 
                                                          
13 For more formal definitions of the different measures of inequality, see Cowell (1995), Jenkins (1995) and  STATA 




and the line of perfect equality.  Intuitively, the Gini coefficient can be given the interpretation 
that if one randomly draws two people from the population, then the expected wage difference 
between these two people as a proportion of the average wage is twice the Gini coefficient.  A 
problem of all those three measures, however, is that as they take into account all observations, 
they are sensitive to errors or real changes at the tails of the distribution. It is also, therefore, 
useful to report ‘the decile ratio’ (ratio of the 90th percentile of the wage distribution to the 10the 
percentile) which is not sensitive to outliers.  
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Source  Statistical Year Lindgren (2005) of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1995-2002 (Cairo, June 2003). *In Technical 
Secondary Education, 9,8% of students are enrolled in the Agricultural track, 43,1% in the Commercial track and 
47,1% in the Industrial Track. Data refer to the year 2000/2001. In Morocco, 92.5 percent of secondary students are 












   
